As the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development at the Pentagon during the first Trump administration, Elbridge Colby was the lead architect of the 2018 national defense strategy. That document called for a far more urgent emphasis on deterring and, if necessary, defeating China.
President-elect Donald Trump has made good choices with his apparent selections of Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) for Secretary of State and Rep. Michael Waltz (R-FL) for national security adviser. Trump also would do well to appoint Colby to a senior national security position, perhaps as Secretary of Defense or CIA director.
The potential appointment of Colby to such senior positions has his critics on the political Right on edge. They reject Colby’s suggestion that the U.S. must urgently refocus its military resources toward the Pacific and away from the Middle East and Europe, including reduced support for Ukraine. Colby’s critics also suggest that he makes excessive demands of allies to significantly increase defense spending.
I believe these criticisms are unfair. I strongly believe in continued U.S. support for Ukraine and for NATO, which also greatly benefits America, and while hard-headed dialogue is positive, Russia is the second foremost U.S. adversary. But, I also see no credible evidence that Colby opposes these contentions per se. Indeed, far from being an ideologue fortified in his own ideological castle, Colby is far more open than most in Washington to debate issues without hubris. We disagree, for example, on what type and measure of aid the U.S. should provide Ukraine and what restrictions the U.S. should impose on U.S. weapons being used inside Russia. Still, Colby has always been willing to debate these points in good faith with me. He has applied the same approach to numerous think tank debates.
Educated at Harvard and Yale Law School, and confident in interviews, Colby is undeniably smart. Yet, my central arguments in favor of Colby are quite basic. Namely, he cares deeply about the country and those who serve it, and his two thematic arguments are very hard to repudiate.
For a start, Colby is correct to assert that U.S. alliance structures cannot survive over the longer term unless allies bear a heavier burden in their support. This must include greater — rather than relatively equal to the U.S. — European Union support for Ukraine. After all, Ukraine borders four separate EU nations and is 4,000 miles from the U.S. Would Europeans respond if Washington demanded they do as much as the U.S. to aid the Bahamas amid an invasion from Cuba? This comment might spark eye rolls from some readers, but it helps explain why members of Congress have had a hard time selling U.S. support for Ukraine. Again, U.S. aid should continue, but doing so won’t be possible unless Europe does more.
Colby is also correct in his second key contention that the U.S. military cannot maintain its current global deployment structure if it is to effectively deter or defeat China in a full-scale war.
On the first point, it is clear that Europe can and must do more in its own defense. Shockingly, just days after Trump won the election, the EU has grudgingly started admitting as much. Until now, the vast majority of EU powers and the new U.K. government of Keir Starmer were insisting that they could not increase defense spending faster because of economic conditions and legislative obstacles.
The BBC now reports that Trump’s election has “focused minds” in London on increasing defense spending to 2.5% of GDP sooner rather than later. Starmer’s latest budget centered on major spending and tax increases, so his excuses against spending 2.5% of GDP will fall flat in the new White House (especially amid his flirtations with China). Similarly, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday that the EU has magically found a way in its budget rules to allow the use of $416 billion in funds to boost arms production. These funds were previously reserved for efforts at “reducing economic inequality between EU countries.” The FT also reports that Taiwan is planning major new defense investments.
Put simply, the money is there if allies decide that the most significant land invasion of Europe since 1945, combined with a rising Chinese hegemon, warrants it. But unless America demands participation in alliance burden sharing, it won’t happen. Germany, which is paring back defense spending and aid to Ukraine, proves as much.
That leads to Colby’s second argument on the need to address the U.S. military’s overstretch. Some on the right attempt to repudiate Colby’s claims here with the weak counterargument that Republicans can massively increase defense spending. But considering the marginal Republican majorities in the new House and Senate, and deficit concerns, it is implausible to expect defense spending increases above a single extra percentage point. The inadequacy of the U.S. defense industrial base means that even significant new funding would not produce outsize short-medium-term capability enhancements.
The basic truth is that the U.S. has too few destroyers, too few fighter jets, and too little willingness in the Pentagon to make trade-offs. This is not a debatable point. During Iran’s recent escalation of tensions with Israel, for example, the Pacific was left without a carrier strike group after the carrier that was supposed to be there was sent to the Middle East. China took advantage of the carrier’s absence in a show of force intersecting Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines with one of its own carriers. This in-the-moment trade-off strategy is not sustainable, especially as North Korea and Russia work to complicate U.S. strategic planning. Extended naval and air squadron deployments designed to paper over capability gaps are exhausting personnel and further complicating already highly problematic repair-maintenance schedules.
The U.S. needs far more of its best Air Force and Navy assets postured out of the Middle East and Europe and instead deployed to the Pacific, or domestically, on high readiness for surge deployments. At the same time, the bulk of the U.S. Army in Europe should be recentered out of Germany and further East into the more threatened but more reliable allied states of the Baltics and Poland. U.S. nuclear forces should retain their European presence.
Does this approach undervalue or endanger allies? I don’t think so. Were Putin to credibly believe that a future Russian invasion of Estonia with a reconstituted military would lead to joint Luftwaffe-Armée de l’air-Belgian air force strikes inside Russia within 24 hours of invasion, (and not just British, Finnish, Polish, and U.S. action), the U.S. could redeploy numerous fighter-bomber squadrons to the Pacific. But considering the sorry state of NATO air exercises, Putin most certainly does not believe that at present. Fortunately, Putin is presently in no position to invade Europe because of his losses in Ukraine. But making it clear to Europe that it must step up now will allow NATO to be stronger tomorrow and the U.S. stronger in the Pacific today.
We must lay stronger foundations for a more sustainable NATO. The de facto European argument that “we would prefer you lose a war to China than force us to spend more on defense” is not a sustainable narrative for the United States.
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The basic point here is that bolder leadership is needed. Much of Washington wants to delude itself into thinking that American military supremacy can coexist with continued overstretch. History, Xi Jinping’s ambition, and the stunning military-productive capacity of the People’s Liberation Army teach otherwise.
If Trump wants a top official who can jostle allies into doing more for themselves and alongside America, and a greater U.S. readiness to confront Chinese aggression, he should appoint Colby to a senior position.
This article was originally published at www.washingtonexaminer.com
