An Iranian nuclear weapon would be a game-changer in the Middle East. Should the Islamic Republic of Iran acquire nuclear weapons, at a minimum, Iranian leaders would feel so secure behind their own nuclear deterrent that they could export terrorism without fear of retaliation. Iranian assassins could murder Americans worldwide, and even the most hawkish administration in Washington would hesitate to respond militarily for fear of escalation.
Many realists argue that the world, even Israel, could live with a nuclear Iran because the Islamic Republic is not suicidal. That is a strawman argument, however. The problem has never been whether the regime is suicidal but rather if it is terminally ill. The custodianship of any Iranian bump would be with the most radical and ideologically pure unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Both the growing frequency of nationwide protests and looming succession raise questions about Iran’s stability. No regime is eternal. If the Islamic Republic’s demise became inevitable — think Romania in 1989 as Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime collapsed around him — the true believers with their hands on Iran’s nuclear arsenal could launch to fulfill what they believe is ideological destiny. There is no way to deter such an attack, for neither Jerusalem nor Washington would gratuitously kill millions of Iranians after the regime they also hate had collapsed. In such a scenario, deterrence collapses.
Israel may have no choice but to attack Iran’s nuclear program in the coming months. While pundits might argue that U.S. and Israeli success at shooting down drones and missiles in April and October 2024 buy Israel time, they interpret the situation completely wrong: If seven out of 300 missiles and drones get through, as happened in the first Iranian salvo, but carried chemical, biological, or radiological warheads, then all bets would be off.
While the world focuses on a possible Iranian nuclear breakout, however, a stealth nuclear threat looms. Turkey’s Russia-built nuclear plant will become operational this year. The notion that it is proliferation-proof rests on the assurance of Ankara and Moscow. Even if proliferation does not occur at the plant, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may replicate Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategy. Iran used its Russian-built Bushehr reactor to legitimize orders and imports it could then divert to supply its covert program.
Speaking on the centennial of the beginning of Turkey’s independence movement just over five years ago, Erdogan hinted at nuclear weapons ambitions. “Several countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us that] we can’t have them. This I cannot accept,” he declared. It was not a one-off event. On Sept. 7, 2024, Hayrettin Karaman, Erdogan’s personal theologian, published an essay arguing, “Either the Islamic world must unite and collaborate with China and Russia, or Turkey must move forward by acquiring nuclear warheads and weapons.” Erdogan has chosen both, apparently.
And, like Iran, Turkey seeks to work on the triad of weaponization: enrichment, warhead design, and delivery. Beginning in 2021, for example, senior Turkish and Pakistani generals and military industry heads have met, apparently to discuss delivery systems.
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It’s deja vu all over again, with one important difference: While Israel can strike at Iran, Turkey’s NATO membership protects it from similar preemptive action. Erdogan may despise the West and hate its primary defense alliance, but he does not withdraw Turkey for two reasons: First, he can use NATO’s consensus provisions to paralyze it from within, and second, he wants NATO mutual defense commitments at least until Turkey gets the bomb, in effect using NATO as a shield against Israel. Talk about a Trojan horse.
Stopping Iran’s nuclear breakout may consume Washington and Jerusalem, but Erdogan, motivated by the same irrational antisemitism as Khamenei, could, thanks in part to NATO, reach the nuclear finish line first.
Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
This article was originally published at www.washingtonexaminer.com
