How Hezbollah took over Lebanon

However, the withdrawal revealed deep-seated sectarian tensions that had long been simmering beneath the surface. Hezbollah and Amal, another powerful Shiite political bloc, organized counterdemonstrations. They rallied the Shiite population against the anti-Syrian movement. Many Shiites perceived the Cedar Revolution as an effort by Sunnis and Christians to curb their rising influence.

Initially, there was a brief moment of national unity following Syria’s withdrawal, but the political landscape soon fractured. Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, newly returned from exile in France, capitalized on Christian disillusionment. Aoun’s rapid rise unsettled traditional Christian leaders like Amine Gemayel, Samir Geagea, and Dory Chamoun, who saw their influence wane in the face of Aoun’s populism. In response, these leaders formed the March 14 coalition alongside the Future Movement, effectively sidelining the FPM. This polarization deepened Lebanon’s sectarian divides: Sunnis largely rallied behind the Hariri-led Future Movement, while Shiites aligned with Hezbollah and Amal. Christians remained split, reflecting their growing anxieties over declining political and demographic power.

The division within the Christian political sphere deepened when Aoun forged an alliance with Hezbollah in 2006 through the Mar Mikhael Agreement. This move fundamentally reshaped Lebanon’s political landscape, polarizing the country into two distinct blocs: the March 14 coalition, backed by Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze under Walid Jumblatt, and the March 8 coalition, led by Hezbollah, Amal, and Aoun’s FPM. These sectarian alliances were not merely political. They reflected competing visions for Lebanon’s future. While March 14 advocated closer ties with the West and Gulf states, March 8 promoted a “Resistance” axis aligned with Iran and Syria.

Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah was framed by both sides as a strategic necessity to safeguard Christian influence in the face of rising Shiite power. Hezbollah, in turn, leveraged this partnership to weaken the Hariri-led Sunni bloc. But this alliance came at a cost for Aoun and the Christians. While the FPM secured symbolic victories, such as ministerial posts, Hezbollah, skilled in political maneuvering, ensured that the true levers of power remained under its control. The 2008 Doha Accords, which ended an 18-month political crisis, were presented as a compromise. Yet, despite Michel Suleiman’s election to the presidency and promises of Christian electoral reforms, the agreement effectively solidified Hezbollah’s dominance over the state.

Hezbollah’s marginalization of Christians was not solely achieved through overt political maneuvers. It also relied on more subtle tactics, such as electoral manipulation. The gerrymandering of districts, particularly in areas like Baabda and Zahle, weakened Christian voting power, allowing Hezbollah’s allies in the FPM to win seats. However, these victories often came at the cost of genuine Christian influence. In practice, the electoral system reinforced Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon’s political landscape, leaving Christian leaders, despite holding formal positions, unable to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance effectively. Hezbollah has even successfully pressured Christian and Druze political factions to pivot away from their traditional Western alliances and align more closely with Iran, China, and Russia. This shift represented not only a geopolitical realignment but also a profound change in Lebanon’s national identity, with pro-Western factions increasingly marginalized.

In the 2009 elections, Saad Hariri led a fragile unity government, but the political landscape became even more complex with Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, which spilled over into Lebanon. The conflict exacerbated sectarian tensions, particularly as Hezbollah intervened militarily to support the Assad regime, justifying its actions as a fight against jihadism. This deepened Lebanon’s polarization, with Christian leaders like Geagea backing the Syrian opposition while Aoun remained firmly aligned with Hezbollah. The result was a prolonged period of political paralysis, leaving the country without a clear path to governance or stability.

After Suleiman’s presidency ended in 2014, Lebanon plunged into a political deadlock. The two-thirds majority required to elect a new president proved to be an insurmountable hurdle, as the March 14 and March 8 blocs could not agree on a candidate. Both Aoun and Geagea, the leading Christian contenders, were seen as too divisive. Aoun’s strong ties to Hezbollah and Syria alienated the Sunni and Druze communities, while Geagea’s alignment with the West and Saudi Arabia made him equally unacceptable to Hezbollah and its allies.

In a surprising move, Saad Hariri nominated Suleiman Frangieh, a Maronite leader from the March 8 bloc, as a compromise candidate for the presidency. Although Frangieh’s Marada Movement was small, his strong ties to Syria made him acceptable to both Damascus and Hezbollah. Hariri’s strategy was to fracture the March 8 bloc by driving a wedge between Aoun and Hezbollah. However, the plan backfired. Rather than dividing March 8, Hariri’s maneuver strengthened Aoun’s candidacy, leading to Aoun’s eventual election as president in 2016 with the support of both Hezbollah and Hariri’s own Future Movement. While Hariri secured the premiership, his decision to back Aoun alienated large segments of the Sunni community, weakening his position and further complicating Lebanon’s already fragile sectarian balance.

Lebanon’s strained relationship with Saudi Arabia reached a breaking point when Minister of Information George Kordahi’s pro-Houthi comments led to a diplomatic crisis. Kordahi praised the Houthi movement in Yemen and criticized the Gulf’s military involvement, prompting a sharp reaction from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. This resulted in the withdrawal of ambassadors and a ban on Lebanese exports to the Gulf, dealing a severe economic blow to Lebanon, already facing a deep financial collapse. The diplomatic rift highlighted Lebanon’s deepening sectarian and geopolitical tensions, with Hezbollah seizing the opportunity to target Sunni political figures aligned with Saudi Arabia. As the economic crisis worsened, Hezbollah capitalized on its control over illicit networks, especially drug smuggling operations targeting the Gulf, to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Gulf aid.

Hezbollah’s influence over Lebanon’s economy is also significant. The group’s control over illicit trade, particularly narcotics smuggling, has created a parallel economy that circumvents traditional Sunni economic strongholds. Sunni business elites, once dominant in sectors like retail and construction, have been increasingly sidelined by Hezbollah-linked enterprises operating outside the formal economy. This economic displacement has further weakened Sunni political actors, who now rely more heavily on external patronage from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to maintain their influence.

Hezbollah’s extensive social services network in regions traditionally controlled by Sunnis or Christians has eroded the influence of Sunni and Christian political elites, who have struggled to offer comparable support to their constituencies. Coupled with Hezbollah’s control over key ministries like Health and Public Works, this has made the group indispensable to large segments of the population, regardless of sectarian identity.

Moreover, Hezbollah has benefited from the steady decline of Lebanon’s Christian population. The exodus of Christians, driven by economic instability and political insecurity, created a demographic vacuum that Hezbollah has filled. In regions like Keserwan and the Metn district, Christian emigration has accelerated Hezbollah’s demographic dominance, further marginalizing Christian political influence.

The theological-legal doctrine of “Wilayat al-Faqih,” or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which guides Hezbollah, ensures that clerical authority remains supreme, making meaningful democratization nearly impossible. This doctrine, which effectively subordinates state institutions to clerical rule, marginalizes both Christian and Sunni political actors, rendering their roles largely ceremonial.

The marginalization of Sunnis, in particular, is compounded by the gradual weakening of Sunni religious institutions. Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdellatif Derian was criticized for his political involvement, with some arguing that Dar El Fatwa, the highest Sunni religious authority, should remain focused on spiritual matters rather than politics. Interestingly, similar criticisms were not directed at Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Béchara Boutros Raï or Jaafari Shiite Mufti Ahmad Kabalan, both of whom have made political statements without facing the same level of reproach. Hezbollah has even cultivated ties with certain Sunni clerics, particularly in economically marginalized areas like Akkar, further dividing the Sunni religious establishment.

Traditionally dominated by Sunnis, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces have seen key positions filled by Hezbollah-aligned Shiite loyalists. Sunni militias that once played a pivotal role in Lebanese politics have either been disbanded or co-opted by Hezbollah, while Sunni political parties remain fractured. Al-Murabitun, a key player during the civil war, was disbanded under the Taif Agreement, leaving the Sunni community without military leverage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, benefiting from its unique status as a “resistance force” against Israel, has gradually brought Sunni groups, such as the Tawhid Movement in Tripoli, under its influence through a combination of political alliances and pressure.

Hezbollah has skillfully exploited Sunni fragmentation by forming pragmatic alliances with smaller Sunni factions. In regions like Sidon and Tripoli, Hezbollah supports marginal Sunni leaders to undermine more prominent Sunni political figures and sow local divisions. In Sidon, for instance, Hezbollah’s backing of the Popular Nasserist Organization, led by Osama Saad, illustrates its strategy of dividing Sunni leadership to weaken overall Sunni unity. These local alliances ensure that no single Sunni political movement can effectively challenge Hezbollah’s dominance within Lebanon’s sectarian system.

The rise of Salafist and jihadist groups in Sunni areas, exacerbated by the spillover of the Syrian civil war, further weakened the moderate Sunni leadership, creating a vacuum that Hezbollah has been quick to exploit. By promoting a narrative of “takfir,” or apostasy, Hezbollah has sought to delegitimize Sunni political actors who oppose its agenda, framing them as extremists or traitors to the Lebanese state.

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Under Hezbollah’s influence, Lebanon’s political system has grown increasingly authoritarian, with key state institutions falling under clerical control. Its political machinations have worked to ensure that key allies like the Christian FPM and Frangieh’s Marada Movement remain beholden to its agenda. This shift has made it impossible for the Christian and Sunni communities to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance, obstructing any chance for political reform.

By embedding itself in Lebanon’s institutions and exploiting sectarianism, Hezbollah has paralyzed the country’s future and directly threatened U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Carlo J.V. Caro has a postgraduate degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles on foreign affairs and security.