Two weeks ago, rifle shots rang out across Jammu and Kashmir as jihadist terrorists murdered 26 unarmed tourists. This week, the northern Indian state got an encore as India and Pakistan exchanged missiles and drone strikes across the border and into central Pakistan.
India and Pakistan have fought repeatedly over this territory since the withdrawing British Empire partitioned the subcontinent. Several of these conflicts have caused concern in Washington, usually over a generalized fear of war between nuclear-armed countries. But now that China is contending for global supremacy, this conflict has taken on a new strategic significance. If the two sides do not back off quickly, Washington should step in.
The most important American interest at stake is the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific theater. The top American military leader in the region, Admiral Samuel Paparo, said last Friday, “The United States will prevail in the conflict [with China] as it stands now, with the force that we have right now,” but the trend line is on “a bad trajectory.” Stretched out over the next few decades, it could be even worse. The human resources of many key American partners, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are declining due to their low birth rates. China has the same problem, but it also has half-a-billion rural people in reserve. Only India has the demographic heft to counterbalance China in Asia.
But China and its friends have effectively surrounded India. China to the north and Pakistan to the west are the most direct threats. But Bangladesh to the east and the Maldives to the south are also becoming more unfriendly to India and more receptive to Beijing. Pakistan has little chance of defeating India in a conventional war, so it is allegedly working with terrorist groups to harm India, and its nuclear arsenal limits India’s ability to respond.
The second concern is that a war between India and Pakistan gives other countries examples for how to fight a nuclear-armed country. Precedents do not work in international politics the same way they do in the legal field. Countries do not play “mother, may I?” unless a hegemon makes them. Even so, the illusion that wars between nuclear states trigger Armageddon was a helpful deterrent. If this war stays conventional, like the Kargil War in 1999 did, Xi Jinping may conclude that the potential downsides of an attack on U.S. forces are minimal. That would be dangerous.
The free world has more to lose than China does if the war goes nuclear. India has no interest in becoming America’s sidekick, but its independence and well-being are more important to America than Pakistan’s is to China. A nuclear war would be a humanitarian catastrophe, break another set of international taboos, and significantly set back the effort to keep Asia free from Chinese domination.
A war would also give China invaluable information about its arsenal. Pakistan has nearly 200 Chinese-made fighter jets, and India has dozens of French ones. China had no hard data about how its jets stack up against the competition, but one of them has already reportedly shot down one of India’s French fighters. During the Cold War, Israel’s military repeatedly faced off against Soviet-supplied Arab armies, which helped Washington learn how to defend itself and its allies from the U.S.S.R. China will reap similar benefits.
In an ideal world, New Delhi would punish Pakistan into ceasing its support for terror without triggering a nuclear war. This will be hard to pull off. As of this writing, Pakistan seems eager to match India blow-for-blow.
This is not a fight that the U.S. military should enter, but Washington still has options to stop a war. Pakistan’s military—which essentially runs the country behind a token civilian government—is wary of becoming a Chinese vassal. During the Cold War and the war in Afghanistan, Washington’s aid and equipment gave Pakistan some freedom for maneuver. But Pakistan allegedly supported the Taliban, and American forces found Osama bin Laden living close to a Pakistani military academy. Offering inducements does not seem wise.
But threatening to cut off its other choices might. Pakistan owes $20 billion to the World Bank and is counting on receiving another $40 billion over the next decade, which depends on Washington’s good will. The Gulf Arabs have also propped up Islamabad, and if they use that leverage, Islamabad will have to choose between deescalating and becoming a Chinese satrapy.
This will be a hard sell to the Gulf Arabs, however. For decades, rumors have floated about a secret deal for Pakistan to give Riyadh nuclear weapons when requested. If true, Riyadh will not be eager to give up on Pakistan.
Unless the United States can offer something better—like security guarantees.
This article was originally published at freebeacon.com
